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Constitutional Law-RIGHT TO JuRY TRIAL-DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS TO NON JUDICIAL MEDICAL REVIEW pANEL HELD V10LATIVE OF STATE CoNSTITUTION- Wright u. Central DuPage Hospi-

tal Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
Jean Mary Wright brought an action in the circuit court of
Cook County, Illinois, seeking damages from Central DuPage
Hospital Association, Dr. John Heitzler, American Hospital Supply Corporation, and V. Mueller & Company for injuries sustained in the defendant hospital while under the care of Dr.
Heitzler. In addition, ·Ms. Wright sought a declaratory judgment
that recent amendments to the Illinois Civil Practice Act 1 were
1. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-58.10 (1975). The
following portions of the act are relevant to this note:
§ 58.2 Procedures in medical malpractice cases
In all cases in which the plaintiff seeks damages on account of injuries
sustained by reason of medical, hospital or other healing art malpractice, the
provisions of Sections 58.3 through 58.10 shall be applicable. Sections 58.3
through 58.10 shall not apply to any other cases.
§ 58.3 Formation of medical review panel

In each case filed, the court shall order convened a medical review panel to
which the case shall be assigned for hearing and determination. Such order shall
be issued no sooner than 120 days nor later than one year after the parties are
at issue on the pleadings. The medical review panel shall consist of one circuit
judge, one practicing physician, and one practicing attorney selected as provided in Section 58.5.
§58.6 Medical review panel procedures
(1) The judge on the panel shall preside over all proceedings of the panel
and shall determine all procedural issues, including matters of evidence. The
panel shall convene with notice to all parties and shall proceed as a body to hear
evidence and argument on the question of liability and on the question of damages. The provisions of this Act concerning procedure in civil cases shall be
followed insofar as practicable. The law of evidence shall be followed, except as
the panel in its discretion may determine otherwise.
(2) Proceedings before the panel shall be adversary, and each party may
call and cross examine witnesses and introduce evidence as at a trial in the
circuit court. The panel shall have the power of subpoena, to be exercised as in
the circuit court. The panel, however, may call witnesses, examine evidence, call
for additional or particular evidence, and may examine or cross examine witnesses as it may determine to be appropriate.
(3) The panel shall consider the pleadings, the evidence, including discovery materials, hospital and medical records, affidavits and such witnesses and
exhibits as the panel or the parties may call or introduce into evidence.
(4) Proceedings of the panel may be conducted in any county in the judicial circuit, as determined by the panel with notice to all parties if not in the
county in which venue lies.
§58. 7 Decisions of medical review panels
(1) The panel shall make its determination according to the applicable
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substantive law. Its determination on the issue of liability and, if liability is
found, on the issue of fair and just compensation for damages, shall be made in
a written opinion. The panel shall state its conclusions of fact and its conclusions of law. A dissenting member may file a written dissent.
(2) The panel shall notify all parties when its determination is to be
handed down, and, within 7days of its decision, shall serve a copy of its opinion
and any dissent on each party and each attorney of record. The panel shall file
its opinion with the Clerk.
§ 58.8 Effect of decision of medical review panel
(1) The parties may, by unanimous written agreement, elect to be bound
by the determination of a medical review panel at any time. In such event, the
determination of the panel shall be binding and conclusive, and judgment may
be entered thereon.
'
(2) In cases where the determination of the panel is unanimous, and where
the parties have not unanimously agreed in writing to be bound by the determination of the panel, each party must file with the Clerk his written acceptance
or rejection of the determination within 28 days of receipt of service of the
written opinion. Any party not timely filing a rejection of the determination
shall be deemed to have accepted it. If the determination is accepted by all
parties, the Court may enter judgment thereon.
(3) Whenever the parties have unanimously agreed to be bound by the
determination of the panel, the Court shall enter judgment thereon unless the
parties shall unanimously agree that no judgment be entered.
(4) A determination of a medical panel shall not be admissible at any
subsequent trial in the circuit court. Whenever the parties have not unanimously agreed to be bound by a determination of a medical review panel, or
have not unanimously accepted the determination of a panel, the panel judge
shall conduct a pretrial conference promptly upon r~sonable notice pursuant
to Supreme Court Rules governing pretrial conferences, and the case shall proceed to trial as in any other civil case, except that any judge who served on a
medical review panel in the case may not preside at the trial.
(5) Whenever a unanimous determination of a medical review panel is
rejected by a party, each party that has accepted the determination may request
any medical society which has supplied names for the roster of practicing physicians for that panel to provide an expert witness for consultation and, if necessary, for testimony at the trial. Upon such request, the medical society shall
make its best good faith efforts to provide a qua!lified physician to consult with
and, if requested, to testify at the trial.
§ 58.9 Expenses of litigation
(1) Non-judicial members of medical review panels shall serve without
compensation; except that they shall receive their actual expenses for travel and
other costs incurred in the performance of their duties.
(3) Where a party who has rejected a unanimous determination of the
medical review panel does not prevail on the trial of the case and has not been
granted a post-trial motion to upset the result of the trial, the trial court on
motion of the prevailing party shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the
reasonable attorneys fees of the prevailing parties and the costs of the medical
review panel and the costs of trial shall be summarily taxed to the rejecting
party in accordance with Section 41 of this Act. Such motion may not be made
or granted if both a party plaintiff and a party defendant have rejected the
determination of the medical review panel.
(5) If a party shall reject a unanimous determination of the medical review
panel, his filing of such written rejection shall be deemed to constitute a refiling
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in violation of the state constitution. 2
The amended portions of the act provide for the formation
and operation of medical malpractice review panels, each composed of one circuit court judge, one practicing physician, and one
practicing attorney. All cases in which plaintiffs seek damages for
injuries sustained from "medical, hospital, or other healing art
malpractice" are submitted to the panel for attempted resolution. If the contesting parties do not unanimously agree with the
decision of the panel, the act allows suit to be filed with the
circuit court to proceed to trial in the customary manner.
The circuit court found that these provisions violated article
VI, sections 1 and 9 of the Illinois Constitution by delegating
essentially judicial functions to nonjudicial personnel, and article
I, section 13 by impairing the protected right to trial by jury. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in all respects
relevant to this note. 3
I.

BACKGROUND

Various substitutes for the traditional system of dispute resoof his complaint, if plaintiff, or his answer, if defendant, for the purposes of any
motion as hereinafter provided, pursuant to Section 41 of this Act.
§ 58.10 Supervisory rules of Supreme Court
The Supreme Court may adopt rules not inconsistent with Sections 58.2
through 58.9 of this Act to govern procedures to be used in selecting medical
review panels and rosters and in the hearing and determination of cases by such
panels. The Supreme Court may adopt rules increasing the size of medical
review panel rosters in the respective judicial circuits.
2. This note deals only with the issues of the delegability of judicial functions to
nonjudicial personnel and the right to trial by jury. The instant case also consolidated
separate actions filed in the circuit court of Cook County by Hartford Casualty Insurance
Company and The Medical Protective Company, both of which sought declaratory judgments holding invalid Medical Malpractice Act§ 3, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013a (1975),
dealing with the restriction of malpractice policy rate increases or cancellations by the
Director of Insurance. Ms. Wright also contested the constitutionality of ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 83, § 22.1, altering the statute of limitations in favor of the physician, and ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 70, § 101, limiting the maximum amount recoverable as a result of medical
malpractice to $500,000.
For background on the attempts of other legislatures to enact similar legislation and
the judicial response thereto, see secondary authorities cited in notes 69, 73 infra.
3. The Supreme Court of Illinois vacated only the circuit court's finding of unconstitutionality relating to Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.2a (1975)
(a provision dealing with releases from liability as a condition of medical treatment), a
section unimportant for the purposes of this note.
Both the circuit and supreme courts also found in favor of Ms. Wright's other two
contentions and in favor of the two insurance companies by declaring that Medical Malpractice Act § 3, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1; ch. 70, § 101; and ch. 73, § 1013a (1975),
constituted special legislation contrary to Illinois Constitution art. IV, § 13. 63111. 2d 313,
325-32, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741-44 (1976).
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lution by trial have been attempted. As discussed below, such
attempts have met with mixed results in different jurisdictions,
and have been challenged as unconstitutional on grounds of improper delegation of judicial power and denial of the right to jury
trial. Judicial and legislative treatment of one alternative, arbitration, is particularly relevant to the instant case, since it is a
commonly approved example of nonjudicial, nonjury trial resolution of disputes. Although the Illinois statute under consideration
in this note is not an arbitration statute, enough similarities exist
to merit a brief examination of arbitration in a constitutional
framework.

A.

Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes

Courts initially viewed agreements to arbitrate with distrust,
fearing in such accords a dangerous encroachment into the judicial realm, and uniformly held arbitration agreements void and
unenforceable. 4 The judiciary's growing unwillingness to interfere
with private individuals' contractual rights, however, combined
with an increasing number of state statutes protecting the right
to form arbitration agreements, gradually changed the disposition of the courts. 5 Recently, statutes guaranteeing the enforceability of arbitration agreements have consistently been upheld
when constitutionally challenged as impermissible delegations of
judicial functions. 8
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE app. 316 (1973) (hereinafter cited as
COMM'N REPORT].
5. Perry v. Cobb, 88 Me. 435, 34 A. 278 (1896) involved two shippers who signed a
written agreement that established them as co-partners in insuring each other for lost
cargo and provided that the two lhould determine the amount of such loss without a resort
to the courts. The Supreme Court of Maine held that the agreement was not strictly an
arbitration contract, since it did not provide for a disinterested third party to arbitrate,
and thus skirted the nondelegability of judicial functions issue. Id. at 436, 34 A. at 279.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to find unconstitutional a state statute
that permitted voluntary arbitration agreements and held that parties who entered such
contracts waived their rights to jury trial and appeal. Cutter v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25
A. 96 (1892).
Some years later, a California court of appeals summarized what had become the
accepted opinion regarding contractual arbitration agreements:
[An arbitration contract] does not authorize individuals by agreement to oust
superior courts of their jurisdiction to try civil actions. . . . It merely recognizes
the right of individuals to enter into binding contracts requiring the submission
to arbitration of differences existing between them with respect to the terms of
the agreement.
Snyder v. Superior Court of Amador County, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263, 265, 74 P.2d 782, 784
(1937).
6. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (federal
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Attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements as a violation
of the right to trial by jury have also been unsuccessful. Grounding its finding on the fact that a jury trial is a right that can be
waived, the New York Court of Appeals in Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg1 found that parties to an arbitration agreement voluntarily consent to waive the jury right. Facing a similar issue in a
constitutional challenge to that state's procedure for mediating
malpractice claims, 8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld
agreements enforcing the panel's decisions when the parties voluntarily agree to be bound, despite significant procedural disadvantages should a party refuse to agree. 9
Compulsory arbitration statutes that require the parties to
submit to arbitration and its results are at the opposite end of the
spectrum: courts view such statutes as suspect and generally find
some basis to hold them unconstitutional. 10 A recent Supreme
Court of Illinois decision invalidated the compulsory arbitration
provision of the state's no-fault automobile insurance statute partially on the ground that it violated the right to jury trial. 11
diversity action by corporation to avoid arbitration agreement with buyer of its products
proved unsuccessful because parties intended to contract to arbitrate such a dispute);
Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965) (father could not
void contract entered into with medical group on behalf of his child providing for arbitration of any controversy); Tuschman Steel Co. v. Tuschman, 181 N.E.2d 322 (C.P. Ohio,
1961) (action to enforce arbitration agreement not violative of constitutional provision
guaranteeing that courts shall be open to every person for redress of injury).
7. 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
8. The New Jersey Plan, established by rule of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
requires that before the panel will provide expert witnesses for the claimant at any subsequent trial caused by the defendant's rejection of the panel's findings, the claimant must
sign a binding agreement, similar to an arbitration contract, not to litigate if the finding
in his or her behalf is unfavorable. N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:21-7. Because expert witnesses are
essential to establish a cause of action in a malpractice suit and are difficult to obtain
due to the professional cohesiveness of physicians, a powerful incentive to sign the agreement exists: even if the claimant prevails before the panel, it will be extremely difficult
to obtain a judgment in court without the provided witnesses. Thus, the claimant undergoes significant pressure to surrender his right to a subsequent jury trial should the panel's
determination be in favor of the defendant.
9. Grove v. Seltzer, 56 N.J. 321, 266 A.2d 301 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Henderson v. Ugalde, 61 Ariz. 221, 147 P .2d 490 (1944) (statute forcing
parties to arbitrate without consent unconstitutional).
11. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The case turns on the
Judicial Act of 1962, retained by the court's interpretation in article VI of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution, which abolished trials de novo. Id. at 489-90, 283 N .E.2d at 480-81. Since
the no-fault statute permitted a party dissatisfied with the result of the arbitration panel
to appeal by a trial de novo, the court held that it violated the intent of article VI of he
constitution. Although this reassning is at best incomplete, the violation of the right to
jury trial apparently results from a constitutional breach of article VI, making the case
questionable precedent for the proposition that a compulsory arbitration statute would
be a derogation of the right to trial by jury in Illinois.
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Exceptions to this general rule exist, however. The most obvious example of a permissible restriction on the right to jury trial
appears in compulsory workmen's compensation acts. Such statutes are usually upheld under the rationale that state constitutional guarantees to the right of trial by jury apply to causes of
action as they existed at common law, and that workmen's compensation statutes abolished old causes of action and created new
ones. 12 Pennsylvania has enacted provisions requiring arbitration
of all civil controversies of $1,000 or less, regardless of the parties'
willingness or consent to do so. 13 Constitutional challenges to the
arbitration statute, including the charge of denial of the right to
a jury trial, were rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.14 The court held that since the statute did not close the
courts completely to a litigant by making the decision of the
arbitration board a final determination, but rather permitted an
appeal by trial de novo, the jury trial right was preserved. 15
Adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act by Illinois in 1961
broadened permissible arbitration rights and enabled parties to
arbitrate any existing or future claims by written agreement. 16
Recognizing in the act a legislative intent to discourage litigation
and foster voluntary resolution of disputes by arbitration, Illinois
courts have consistently upheld arbitration agreements when validly executed. 17 Summarized by an appellate court of Illinois, it
12. See Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 242 P. 314 (1925); Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co.,
217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940); Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 156
Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929). Further justification appears in a mutual surrender of rights
and defenses: the employee gives up the right to recover beyond the statutory limit and
the employer is prevented from invoking the defense of no negligence.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 21 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977).
14. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 2~3, 122 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
15. ld. at 230-31, 112 A.2d at 629-30.
16. Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (1975). Subsequent to the decision invalidating malpractice mediation panels in the instant case, an
amendment was passed excluding from the scope of the Uniform Aribitration Act "any
agreement between a patient and a hospital or health care provider to submit to binding
arbitration . . . . " P.A. 79-1361 § 9, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977). A new act was substituted that specifically allows parties to a malpractice controversy to sign and enforce an arbitration agreement. Malpractice Arbitration Act § 1, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). Forced by the Supreme Court of
Dlinois to abandon the mandatory submission of malpractice claims to a mediation panel,
the legislature thus displayed its continued intention to design an alternative to the
traditional court process for settling malpractice cases.
17. E.g., Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N .E.2d 149 (otherwise valid
arbitration agreement between automobile insurer and insured did not extend to specific
issues under dispute); Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Dl. App. 2d 262, 243 N.E.2d 711 (arbitra-
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is "a well recognized principle that courts should look with favor
upon arbitration as a method of settling controversies. " 18
B.
1.

Delegation of Judicial Functions to Nonjudicial Personnel
Precedent in Illinois

The Illinois Constitution provides for a separation of powers
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state
government and stipulates that "[n]o branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." 19 State judicial power is
vested in a supreme court, appellate court, and circuit courts, 20
the latter assuming original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters
with limited exceptions accorded to the supreme court. 21
Judicial response to legislative attempts to encroach on the
jurisdiction of the courts has been strict. The Supreme Court of
Illinois has defined judicial power as "an exclusive and exhaustive grant vesting all such power in the courts," 22 reflecting a
much earlier decision that "the jurisdiction of the circuit courts,
so far as conferred by the constitution, cannot be taken away, nor
can it be changed or abridged by an act of the legislature." 23
Proper jurisdiction of the courts encompasses all "inherently judicial functions," defined in People v. Bruner to include "[t]he
interpretation of statutes, the determination of their validity, and
the application of the rules and principles of the common law,
among others . . . . " 24 Distinguishing a Pennsylvania case, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Grace v. Howlett stated that a compulsory arbitration statute for automobile insurance claims interfered with the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. 25
tion agreement that covered future as well as existing controversies when contract entered
into did not oust courts of jurisdiction).
18. William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 131 Ill. App. 2d 532, 535, 266 N.E.2d 504, 507
(1970).
19. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
20. Id. art. VI, § 1.
21. Id. art. VI, § 9. The entire section reads:
Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except
when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to
redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve
or resume office. Circuit Couuts shall have such power to review administrative
action as prescribed by law.
22. Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952).
23. Birkowitz v. Lester, 121 Ill. 99, 106, 11 N.E. 860, 863 (1887).
24. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 158, 175 N.E. 400, 405 (1931).
25. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 490, 283 N.E.2d 474,480 (1972). The basis of the
court's opinion, however, was that because the statute provided for an appeal by a party
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2.

Precedent in other jurisdictions
Malpractice mediation panels exist in various forms in
eleven states. 28 New Hampshire, 27 Florida, 28 and New York29 have
created malpractice review panels similar to that of Illinois. Constitutional provisions affecting the delegation of judicial functions under which such statutes were enacted, however, differ
among the states.
New Hampshire's Constitution contains a separation of powers article that provides that "the legislative, executive, and judicial [powers] ought to be kept as separate from, and indepen-

dissatisfied with the board's determination, proceedings before the arbitration board
could not be likened to pretrial procedure and were violative of the Judicial Act of 1962,
which abolished trials de novo. Note 11 supra. See also Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152,
139 N.E. 95 (1923); White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 129 N.E. 753 (1921).
These cases found that executory agreements to arbitrate any dispute that may arise
under the agreement and that preclude the individual's resort to the courts are void and
unenforceable. The court in Grace, Cocalis, and Slawek, however, did not deal with the
constitutionality of a mediation panel whose decisions are not binding and do not limit
access to the courts, failing the assent of the parties in each case.
26. Miike, State Legisltures Address the Medical Malpractice Situation, 8 J. LEGAL
Mm. 25, 26 (1975).
27. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 519-A:1 to -A:10 (1974). Malpractice claims must first
be submitted to a mediation panel composed of a layman, a physician, and a judicial
referee, who is usually a judge of one of the courts of original jurisdiction. The procedure
before the panel is informal and controlled by the referee. The panel is requied to apply
the appropriate state laws in reaching its decision and to make a finding of damages if
the determination is in favor of the claimant. Both parties must file an acceptance or
rejection of the panel's decision within 30 days: if both agree to the finding, it is legally
enforceable; if one or both reject the decision, the claimant my instigate litigation in the
appropriate court. Findings of the panel are not admissible in any subsequent court
proceedings.
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44, .47 (West Supp. 1977). A circuit court judge (referee),
a licensed physician, and an attorney compose the malpractice mediation panel to which
claims must initially be submitted. Mter the complaint is filed, the defendant has 20 days
to respond. If no answer is filed, the jurisdiction of the panel ceases, making direct entry
into the courts possible. If the defendant does respond, the panel is required to determine
if actionable negligence occurred. If the parties agree, the panel may then continue mediation to assist the parties in reaching a settlement. If either party rejects the panel's
determination, the claimant may instigate litigation in the usual manner. The conclusion
of the panel, but not its specific findings of fact, is admissible in subsequent proceedings.
The judicial referee has "exclusive authority to rule on all matters of law and the admissibility of relevant evidence as may be adduced by the parties." In re Transition Rule 21,
316 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 1975).
29. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). The medical malpractice
panel is composed of a supreme court justice, a physician, and a lawyer, with the justice
presiding over the panel's sessions. Malpractice claims are submitted first to the panel
for an informal hearing on the issues. If the panel reaches a disposition, an appropriate
order to that effect is entered. If no decision is tendered, the case is remanded to its regular
place on the court's calendar. In the event either party does not concur with the panel's
determination, the claimant can bring an action in the usual manner. A unanimous
written recommendation of the panel is admissible in any subsequent court proceedings.
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dent of, each other, as the nature of a free government will admit
30
• • • •"
Although not as strict in its definition of the division of
powers as the similar Illinois provision, 31 the article has been
interpreted by New Hampshire courts to have essentially the
same effect as its Illinois counterpart, with only some additional
leeway for an overlapping of powers. 32 The New Hampshire Constitution is substantially more liberal than that of Illinois in the
role assigned the legislature to outline the jurisdiction of the
courts. New Hampshire has no autonomous unified court of original jurisdiction, and several of the courts in which litigation originates are dependent ·upon the legislature for the regulation of
their jurisdiction.33
The Constitution of Florida enunciates a separation of powers doctrine virtually identical to that of Illinois. 34 Original jurisdiction for all cases not cognizable by the county courts vests in
the circuit courts. 35
New York's Constitution contains no specific separation of
powers section. With the exception of certain courts established
to handle matters specifically outlined in the constitution, 38
"general original jurisdiction in law and equity" lies with the
supreme court. 37 A general section in the article on the judiciary,
however, gives the legislature "the same power to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it
has heretofore exercised, " 38 thus affording the legislature in certain circumstances greater authority to modify the original jurisdiction of the various courts than exists in any of the three states
previously discussed.
30. N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 37.
31. Note 19 and accompanying text supra.
32. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 A. 640 (1933).
33. N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 76-77, 80.
34. FLA. CoNST. art. 2, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein."
35. ld. art. 5, § 5. Article 5, § 6 establishes a county court in each county and gives
the legislature power to prescribe by general law the jurisdiction of these courts. Presently
the county courts have original jurisdiction over all actions at law where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $2,500. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01 (West 1974). The majority of
malpractice claims exceed this sum, however, and original jurisdiction of such suits would
thus lie with the circuit court under FLA. CoNST. art. 5, § 5.
36. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI,§ 9 (Court of Claims);§§ 10-11 (County Court);§ 12 (Surrogate's Court); § 13 (Family Court); § 15 (Civil and Criminal Courts in New York City); §
16 (District Courts); § 17 (Town, Village, and City Courts).
37. ld. § 7(a).
38. ld. § 30.
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Medical malpractice review panels have not been declared
unconstitutional in any other jurisdiction, including the three
discussed above, on the ground that judicial functions have been
delegated impermisibly to nonjudicial personnel.
C.

Interferences with the Right to Trial by Jury

The seventh amendment guarantee of the right to trial by
jury in suits at common law has not been applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 39
Consequently, states are not required to apply federal law respecting the jury right to malpractice claims. 40 Every state but
one, however, has a constitutional provision ensuring the right to
trial by jury in civil actionsY With the exception of workmen's
compensation statutes, a statute enacting a system of compulsory
arbitration for general civil cases would probably be declared
unconstitutional in nearly every state. 42 The constitutionality of
state laws that provide for methods of mediation amounting to
less than compulsory arbitration remains in doubt.
1.

Precedent in Illinois

The Illinois Constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial
by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." 43 This has
been interpreted to incorporate the right to jury trial as it existed
at common law when the first Illinois constitution was adopted. 44
39. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 542 (9th ed. 1975); see Montana Co. v. St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894); Walker v. Saurinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
40. Like many other state laws that have established malpractice review panels, the
Illinois statute does not answer .the question of whether a claim brought under diversity
jurisdiction would also first have to be presented to the mediation panel before advancing
to federal district court. It is clear, however, that once a malpractice action is brought
under lllinois law in federal district court, the seventh amendment jury right guarantee
will apply. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this note to discuss the potentially
different impact the federal guarantee to a jury trial might have on mediation panel
proceedings.
41. See 8 STAN. L. REv. 410, 413 n.25 (1956).
42. 8 STAN. L. REv. 410 (1956). Pennsylvania is possibly the only exception. Notes
13-15 and accompanying text supra.
43. ILL. CoNST. art. 1, § 13.
44. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. at 146, 175 N.E. at 401; George v. People, 167 Ill. 447,
47 N.E. 741 (1897). In George, the court, referring to the state constitutions of 1818, 1848,
and 1870, stated:
We do not think there is any substantial difference between the provisions
incorporated in the three constitutions. The right of trial by jury was the same
under one constitution as under the other. The right protected by each constitu-
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The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Kelly 45 reiterated the
components of the common law jury right as requiring twelve
impartial, qualified jurors who should unanimously decide the
facts in controversy under the direction and superintendence of
a judge; but the court also stated that "[i]t is well settled that
the object of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of
a trial by jury is to preserve the substance of the right rather than
to prescribe the details of the methods by which it shall be exercised and enjoyed. " 46 As was held in a later Illinois case, "the
right of trial by jury is not so inelastic as to render unchangeable
every characteristic and specification of the common law jury
system. Flexibility for the adjustment of details remains, as long
as the essentials of the system are retained. " 47
As noted previously, the court found in Grace v. Howlett that
a compulsory arbitration statute interfered with the right to trial
by jury. 48 In the instant case, however, the Illinois court confronted for the first time a statutory scheme providing for the
mandatory mediation of claims with provision for a resort to the
customary channels to instigate litigation, rather than an appeal,
should the parties fail to agree.
2.

Precedent in other jurisdictions

Constitutional provisions in New Hampshire, 49 Florida, 5° and
tion was the right of trial by jury as it existed at common law.
ld. at 455, 47 N.E. at 743.
The setting of damages was not a function reserved for the jury under the common
law. The Illinois Supreme Court has held:
At common law an assessment of damages is an inquest of office, usually performed by the sheriff upon a writ of inquiry of damages, or might be assessed
by the court. It has been distinctly held that assessment of damages is not a
trial, and does not come within the provisions of the constitution.
O'Brian v. Brown, 403 Ill. 183, 193, 85 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1949). Customary practice in
Illinois, however, is to the contrary. See Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
486, 488 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
45. 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931).
46. Id. at 224, 179 N .E. at 899.
47. People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332 (1959).
48. 51 Ill. 2d at 489-90, 283 N.E.2d at 480-81. For an explanation of the limitation of
this opinion as precedent respecting the right to trial by jury, see note 11 supra.
49. N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 20.
In all controversies concerning property-and in all suits between two or
more persons, except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and
practiced, and except in cases in which the value in controversy does not exceed
five hundred dollars, and title of real estate is not concerned the parties have a
right to a trial by jury and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless,
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New York51 ensuring the right to trial by jury are in all essential
respects similar to that of Illinois. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire has stated that "[ t]he constitutional right of jury
trial is not infringed if a reasonably unfettered right of appeal
from a justice to a jury court is allowed." 52 Thus, the legislature
may design alternative methods of adjudication, provided that a
jury trial is ultimately available to the parties. Such precedent
may in part be responsible for the lack of any constitutional challenge to New Hampshire's malpractice mediation panel.
The Supreme Court of Florida established early precedent
that the guarantee of a jury trial would be strictly construed: "It
shall 'remain inviolate.' This term does not merely imply that the
right of jury trial shall not be abolished or wholly denied but that
it shall not be impaired. " 53 Such precedent, however, has not
prevented the court from participating in the establishment of
the Florida malpractice mediation panel, which requires a claimant to first file with the panel and attempt arbitration with the
defendant before being permitted to resort to a jury trial. In re
Transition Rule 21 54 sets out procedural rules adopted by the
Supreme Court of Florida for the operation of the panel. A recent
appeal challenging the constitutionality of the malpractice statute on equal protection grounds and as an abridgement of free
access to the courts was unsuccessful. 55 The court's opinion made
no mention of the denial of the right to trial by jury. The concurring opinion compared the mediation panel procedure to a required pretrial settlement conference, a procedure common in
many jurisdictions before litigation progresses to trial. 58
The New York malpractice mediation panel was originally
established by judicial action on an experimental basis, 57 and was
in cases arising on the high seas and such as relates to mariners' wages the
legislature shall think it necessary to alter it.
50. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22. "The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and
remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall
be fixed by law."
51. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2. "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may
be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law."
52. Perkins v. Towle, 58 N.Y. 425 (1878).
53. Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848) (emphasis in original).
54. 316 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1975).
55. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
56. /d. at 807.
57. The Appellate Division, First Department, of the Supreme Court of New York
established an experimental panel procedure for the handling of medical malpractice
claims on August 31, 1971. N.Y. CT. R. § 636.1 (McKinney 1976).
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later enacted into law by the legislature. 58 Recently the statute
was challenged on constitutional grounds in Halpern v. Gozan59
by a physician who alleged that the introduction at trial of the
panel's finding of his negligence so prejudiced the jurors as to
deprive him of his right to trial by jury. In rejecting this contention and upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court
concluded that "the new [mediation panel] law, if carefully pursued and thoughtfully articulated does not represent an incursion
upon constitutional guarantees, but rather, reflects the proper
extension of legislative prerogatives." 80

n.

INsTANT CAsE

The court relied on article VI, sections 1 and 9 of the Illinois
Constitution, which vests general judicial authority in a state
court system and original jurisdiction for all justiciable matters
in the circuit courts, to find that use of the malpractice panel was
unconstitutional in that it granted essentially judicial functions
to nonjudicial personnel. 81 The major issue in the delegability of
judicial functions was who is authorized to apply the substantive
law to findings of fact. The appropriate statutory section provides
that "[ t]he panel shall make its determination according to the
applicable substantive law." 82 Such language, the court con58. N.Y. Jun. LAw§ 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
59. 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
60. !d. at 749.
61. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40
(1976).
The court noted with apparent approval that the Illinois Civil Practice Act requires
the judge member of the panel to "preside over all proceedings of the panel" and to
"decide all procedural i~sues, including matters of evidence" in the framework of an
adversary proceeding in which witnesses are examined and evidence is introduced "as at
a trial in the circuit court." Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.6(1)(2) (1975).
The court's opinion, perhaps unwittingly, echoes an ambiguity contained in this
subsection of the statute. While the circuit judge is authorized to determine all procedural
matters including questions of evidence, the concluding sentence of the subsection provides that "[t]he law of evidence shall be followed except as the panel in its discretion
may determine otherwise." !d. § 58.6(1). The court does not overtly recognize in its
opinion the existence of a conflict in meaning, but simply assumes that the latter provision
take precedence over the judge's prerogative to decide procedural and evidentiary matters,
and interprets this limitation on the judge's power as another opportunity for the nonjudicial members of the panel to usurp a judicial function. 63 Ill. 2d at 322, 347 N.E.2d at
739. Another interpretation not considered by the court that would permit an internally
consistent reading of the statute would be that the physician and lawyer members of the
panel serve as advisors to the judge on such procedural matters, but that any decision to
vary from the law of evidence must have the concurrence of the judge.
62. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.7(1) (1975).
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eluded, implied that the physician and lawyer members of the
panel had equal authority with the circuit judge to decide matters
of law; thus, the possibility existed that nonjudicial members of
the panel could overrule the judge in the application of principles
of law, an inherently judicial function, thereby violating the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. 83
The court based its holding that the malpractice review
panel violated the right to trial by jury in article I, section 13 of
the Illinois Constitution. Quoting People v. Lobb, 84 the court interpreted the right to a jury trial to be that right as it existed
under common law, which "is the right to have the facts in controversy determined, under the direction and superintendence of
a judge, by the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial jurors
. . . . " 85 Unsuccessful attempts at the last Illinois Constitutional
Convention to modify the jury trial right influenced the court to
strictly construe the Lobb standards. 88
Unlike the court's analysis in regard to the nondelegability
of judicial functions, its reasoning respecting the right to jury trial
was not so categorically final. The court concluded that as long
as the essentials of the common law right remain, flexibility exists
in administering the right in practice, and details of the system
can be adjusted. 87 At no time did the court specifically state that
the procedure outlined for the malpractice review panel was itself
a violation of the right to jury trial under article I, section 13.
Rather, the court found for unstated reasons that the holding of
unconstitutionality for improper delegation of judicial functions
implied that the statute was also "an impermissible restriction on
the right of trial by jury guaranteed by" the Illinois Constitution.88
ill.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court of Illinois did not dispose of the instant
case in a vacuum of concern about the issues involved: recent
marked increases in medical malpractice suits and awards in
63. In support of its finding, the court cited People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E.
400 (1931) and·Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952). Notes 22,
24 and accompanying text supra.
64. 17 Ill. 2d 287, 161 N .E.2d 325 (1959).
65. ld. at 298, 161 N.E.2d at 331.
66. 63 Ill. 2d at 323, 347 N.E.2d at 740.
67. ld. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 740-41 (relying on People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d at 299, 161
N.E.2d at 332). For text of material from Lobb quoted in the instant case, see text
accompanying note 47 supra.
68. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
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Illinois and other states have created a well-publicized crisis in
medical care that promises serious detriments to the patient. 69
Insurance rates for malpractice coverage have increased dramatically/0 resulting in the threat that many physicians will limit or
curtail their practices. 71 Such increases are caused at least in part
by a geometric progression in the magnitude of personal injury
awards. 72 The response of state legislatures has been impressive;
virtually every state has studied the malpractice problem, and
most have enacted various legislative proposals to assist in the
provision of reasonably priced malpractice insurance and to
speed up the traditional litigation process for malpractice
claims. 73 Eleven states have passed statutes establishing mal69. E.g., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58; U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Jan. 20, 1975,
at 53. For a comprehensive background of the complex issues surrounding the cause and
drastic rise of malpractice suits, the problem of malpractice insurance, and suggested
solutions, see CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 4. Other helpful publications of a general nature
on medical malpractice include: R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABoUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1975);
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); A. HoLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw (1975).
70. "Premiums for dentists rose 115 percent between 1960 and 1970; those for hospitals, 262.7 percent; those for physicians other than surgeons, 540.8 percent; and those for
surgeons, 949.2 percent." CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 13. It is not unusual for a
physician to pay from $5,000 to $12,000 per year for malpractice insurance coverage.
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. Pt-. L. REv. 590, 595 n.16 (1973).
71. Note, Ohio's Rx for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. CIN.
L. REv. 90, 90 n.1 (1976).
72. One survey has reported the average recovery per claim in California over a
several year period: $5,000 in 1969; $7,500 in 1973; $12,000 in 1975; and $25,000 projected
in 1980. Mill, Malpractice Litigation: Are Solutions in Sight?, 232 J.A.M.A. 369 (1975).
73. Miike, supra note 26, at 25. In language cited in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d
802 (Fla. 1976), the Florida legislature indicated its purposes in establishing a medical
mediation panel procedure:
WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance
for doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few
months; and
WHEREAS, it is not uncommon to find physicians in high-risk categories
paying premiums in excess of $20,000 annually; and
WHEREAS, the consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens created by the high cost of insurance; and
WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced to curtail
their practices, retire, or practice defensive medicine at increased cost to the
citizens of Florida, and
WHEREAS, the problem has reached crisis proportion in Florida,
NOW THEREFORE * * *
/d. at 805. Similar reasons were cited by the Supreme Court of New York in Halpern v.
Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1976) for the enacting of New York's law. Briefs
filed by amici curiae in the instant case and cited by the court pointed to similar problems
in Illinois. 63 Ill. 2d at 321, 347 N .E.2d at 739.
For other recent surveys of state legislative responses to the malpractice crisis, see
Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TuL. L. REv. 655
(1976); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice
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practice mediation panels that provide in varying degrees for the
prescreening or arbitration of claims. 74 Issues that are so widespread and directly affect every person who requires medical services demand the careful attention of the courts.
In addition to the compelling nature of the underlying issues,
court review of the constitutionality of a legislative act requires
judicial caution. The Supreme Court of Florida, in holding that
state's malpractice mediation panel constitutional, provided:
It is incumbent on this Court when reasonably possible and
consistent with constitutional rights to resolve all doubts as to
the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutional validity and
if possible a statute should be construed in such a manner as
would be consistent with the constitution, that is in such a way
as to remove it farthest from constitutional infirmity. 75

The New York Supreme Court, upholding the state statute creating mediation panels, concluded that an act of the legislature
should be declared unconstitutional only if such a finding is inescapable.76
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not refer in the instant
case to this customarily strict standard in declaring unconstitutional the malpractice mediation panel procedure. Perhaps the
court felt its conclusions were so clear-cut that reference to the
standard of construction was unnecessary. Also possible was the
realization that exercising customary judicial caution before declaring the malpractice statute unconstitutional would require
the court to undertake a more rigorous examination of the issues
than it was willing to make. Although the court in its forthright
but cursory treatment of the issues discussed in this note 77 attempted to convey the impression that the outcome of the case
should be obvious, closer examination reveals that the court
could have interpreted the statute to be reasonably consistent
with the Illinois Constitution.
Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 (entire issue devoted to malpractice problems). For symposium discussions of recent legislative changes that have occurred in Indiana, Texas, and
Montana, see Symposium, The 1975 Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 91
(1975); Studen~ Symposium, A Study of Medical Malpractice in Texas, 7 ST. MARY's L.J.
732 (1976); Gibbs, The Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, 36
MoNT. L. REv. 321 (1975).
74. Miike, supra note 26, at 26, 30 (Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin).
75. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d at 805.
76. Halpern v. Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 749 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
77. The court was more comprehensive in its discussion of Medical Malpractice Act
§ 4, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975), relating to the maximum amount recoverable
from a malpractice claim, perhaps because a strong dissent was voiced on this issue.
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Delegability of Judicial Functions

The Illinois Constitution is exact in its grant of judicial authority to the state court system and original jurisdiction to the
circuit courts. 78 Illinois case law generally has been strict in dealing with division of powers questions. 79
Faced with a novel factual and legal situation, the court
responded by mechanically applying constitutional principles to
a situation for which they were not comfortably applicable. Although the holding could be viewed as a reasonable application
of analogous precedent to a new and pressing problem, in light
of the malpractice crisis and the court's responsibility to resolve
constitutional doubts in favor of the legislature's actions, the
court should have attempted to construe the malpractice act with
greater imagination and sounder reasoning.
The procedure governing the Illinois malpractice mediation
panel is a cross between binding compulsory arbitration and an
arbitration agreement: 80 it forces all claims to be submitted to a
mediation panel as in compulsory arbitration, but like contractual arbitration arrangements it enforces a judgment only when
all the parties agree to be bound by the result. Had certain factors
been properly analyzed, however, the court should have construed the mediation panel as closer in· form to the arbitration
agreement.
The following chart demonstrates the possible situations that
could arise under the medical malpractice panel statute.
Reaction of Parties

Panel's Decision

Unanimous written
agreement to abide
by panel's decision
before panel decides

2tol

Unanimous written
agreement to accept
decision of panel
already rendered

2tol

No unanimous
agreement

3to0

or
3to0

or
3to0

Result

Comment

Conclusive- judgment
will be entered thereon
unless the parties agree
that no judgment be
entered.
Conclusive - unless the
parties unanimously
reject the decision.
Party must reject the
decision within 28 days
If rejected: matter
proceeds to trial.
If not rejected:
decision is conclusive.

78. Notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
79. Notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
80. Notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra.

Parties not rejecting
get expert witnesses
at trial supplied by
panel. If rejecting
party loses at trial,
may have to pay
all costs.
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Case automatically
proceeds to trial in
usual manner. Judge
conducts pretrial
conference.

The court found that since the panel was required to make its
determination "according to the applicable substantive law," 81
the physician and lawyer members of the panel could prevail over
the opinion of the judge and there by usurp an inherently judicial
function. 82 Given the prior acceptance by Illinois courts of voluntary arbitration agreements, this reasoning is invalid. 83 If the parties agree to be bound by the panel's finding either before or after
its determination, the resultant procedure operates similarly to
arbitration by voluntary agreement, which does not require the
involvement of a judge. 84
If the parties do not agree to be bound by the panel's decision, the situation is removed from the realm of the analogous
arbitration agreement. In this situation, however, the judicial
function is not usurped. If the panel decision is unanimous, the
judge member of the panel could not be in a minority position,
and any party rejecting the decision within twenty-eight days can
force the proceeding to trial. If the judge (or any other member
of the panel) disagrees with the majority decision, the case automatically proceeds to trial in a court of original jurisdiction unless
the parties subsequently agree to abide by the result. In the event
of such agreement by the parties, the situation is once again
analogous to the voluntary arbitration agreement, a contract that
is constitutionally permitted in virtually every jurisdiction. 85 This
analysis eliminates the court's objection that the physician and
lawyer members of the panel could prevail over judicial authority.
The court also could have interpreted the mediation panel
proceeding to be analogous to a mandatory pretrial conference. 86
Provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act establishing the mal81. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.7 (1975).
82. Notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
85. Notes 5-9, 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
86. This approach was suggested by a concurring justice in Carter v. Sparkman, 335
So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976).
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practice panel87 were added to the section governing pretrial procedure, 88 suggesting a legislative intent to classify proceedings of
the malpractice panel as pretrial in nature. Court rules governing
pretrial conferences permit the circuit court to hold such a conference in any civil case to consider, among other specifically mentioned objectives, "any . . . matters which may aid in the disposition of the action." 89 The circuit court is further directed to
enter an order stipulating the agreements made by the parties
and delineating any issues for trial not decided during the conference. 90 Striking parallels exist between pretrial conferences and
mediation panel proceedings. 91
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Grace v. Howlett 92 rejected
the contention that a system of compulsory arbitration under the
state's no-fault automobile statute was analogous to a mandatory
pretrial conference. The decision, however, was based on the fact
that if a claim proceeded to trial, the court would be reviewing a
final judgment on appeal in violation of the Judicial Article of
1962 that abolished trials de novo. 93 The malpractice mediation
panel does not make any conclusive determinations unless both
parties agree, and any further action that is undertaken in the
circuit court is brought not as an appeal but as a normal case filed
in the court of original jurisdiction. 94 In the instant case the court
did not refer to its decision in Grace, likely because of the above
distinction.
87. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-58.10 (1975).
88. ld. § 58.1.
89. ILL. PRAc. ACT & R. ch. 110A, § 218(a)(5)(Smith-Hurd 1976).
90. ld. § 218(b).
91. The purpose of the malpractice mediation panel, like that of a pretrial conference,
is to encourage parties to reach agreement on all possible issues. When the parties cannot
agree, however, the claim proceeds to trial in the normal manner. Mediation panel proceedings, like unresolved issues discussed in pretrial conference, are also not admissible
in a subsequent trial. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4)
(1975).
92. 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
93. ld. at 489-90, 283 N.E.2d at 480-81; notes 11, 25 supra. The dissenting judge in
Grace challenged the application of the Judicial Article of 1962 to an appeal from the
arbitration board as being an unwarranted extension of the prohibition against an appeal
de novo. 51 Ill. 2d at 512, 283 N.E.2d at 491-92. An adoption of the dissent's reasoning on
this point alone might have resulted in an entirely different holding in which the arbitration board could have continued to function in certain automobile accident disputes.
94. Even if the court determined that an action instituted in the district court after
the parties failed to agree at the mediation panel level were, in effect, a trial de novo, the
arguments voiced by the dissenting justice in Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d at 512, 283
N .E.2d at 491-92 would be even more persuasive that such trials de novo were not contemplated in the Judicial Article of 1962 abolishing them, and therefore would be excluded
from the prohibition.
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One important reservation should be mentioned when attempting to cast panel proceedings in the light of a pretrial conference. Language in the mediation panel statute directs the
judge to conduct a pretrial conference in the event the parties
cannot agree and the panel's finding is not unanimous. 95 This
indicates that the legislature did not intend the mediation panel
procedure to be a pretrial conference as such. The close similarity
both in purpose and procedure between the two proceedings, however, would have allowed the court to reasonably construe the
malpractice panel act as consistent with the state constitution.

B.

Mediation Panels and the Right to Jury Trial

Although the court found that the statute violated the right
to jury trial, it relied heavily on its finding that the statute unconstitutionally delegated judicial functions. After limited discussion of the jury trial issue, the court finally concluded, rather
weakly, that "[b]ecause we have held that these statutes providing for medical review panels are unconstitutional [due to an
impermissible delegation of judicial functions], it follows that
the procedure prescribed therein as the prerequisite to jury trial
is an impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury
96
••••"
The court cited precedent that the retention of the essentials of the right to jury trial, even though details in procedure
are adjusted, protects this constitutional prerogative. 97 As if to
underscore its deliberate effort to afford the legislature leeway in
designing future malpractice litigation procedures, the court concluded that "[i]n so holding, however, we do not imply that a
valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised. " 98
The court's recognition that valid mediation procedures
could be devised is reasonable in light of recently established
precedent from other jurisdictions. A recent unsuccessful constitutional challenge to New York's mediation panel procedure was
based not on interference with obtaining a jury trial, but on the
fact that panel findings, admissible in court, unduly prejudice the
jury and prevent a fair determination. 99 The Illinois statute pre95. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4) (1975).
96. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (emphasis added).
97. People v. Lobb, 171ll. 2d at 299, 161 N.E.2d at 332.
98. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
99. Halpern v. Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In Florida, a state in which
the right to trial by jury is also strictly construed (note 53 and accompanying text supra)
a recent case challenging the constitutionality of a mediation panel procedure similar to
that of Illinois did not even raise the issue of interference with this right, and the court
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eludes such a challenge by banning the record of mediation panel
proceedings from a subsequent trial. 100 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in holding that state's compulsory arbitration statute constitutional, maintained that "there is no denial of the
right of trial by jury if the statute preserves that right to each of
the parties by the allowance of an appeal from the decision of the
arbitrators or other tribunal." 101 The Illinois law ensures the parties the right to trial by jury if no consensus is reached with the
mediation panel; only if all parties agree to bind themselves to
the panel's determination is the jury right forgone. 102
Decisions in Florida and New York upholding similar legislation creating malpractice mediation panels had not been handed
down when the Supreme Court of Illinois declared the Illinois
statute unconstitutional. Had these decisions been available, the
court might have held differently. Although the court did not
specify the kind of pretrial panel that would be permissible, 103 it
in essence volunteered that if a malpractice panel procedure
could be created that did not contravene the constitution on any
other ground, panel proceedings would not violate the jury clause
of the Illinois Constitution.
C.

Implications of the Court's Decision

The most immediate impact of the court's decision is the
reinstitution of the traditional tort claims process for malpractice
suits in Illinois. A return to the former means of litigation carries
with it the significant risk that personal injury awards will continue to escalate, hiking insurance rates for malpractice coverage
still further and giving physicians incentive to limit their practices or leave the profession altogether. 104
A second result of the court's decision is the surrender of
significant benefits that could be secured by use of the panel
procedure. Admittedly, the mediation panel is no panacea for the
variety of problems surrounding the malpractice crisis. For those
who reject panel determinations and proceed to trial, the mediation procedure presents an additional hurdle in an already complicated and expensive adjudication procedure. Others may even
upheld the entire statute as constitutional. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
100. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4)(1975).
101. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 230, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (1955) (citations omitted).
102. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
103. For an indication that some form of pretrial panel procedure for malpractice
suits would be acceptable, see note 96 and accompanying text supra.
104. Notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.
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be discouraged from proceeding further at all. But the advantages
of the malpractice mediation panel seem to significantly outweigh the potential detriments. Panels are composed of experts
who, unlike members of a jury, are accustomed to dealing with
complex medical malpractice questions and are thus able to
effectively screen out nonmeritorious claims. As a result of their
expertise, the informal nature of panel proceedings, and built-in
incentives for the parties to settle, panel members are able to
dispose of claims with a significantly higher degree of efficiency
than the courts. In New York, cases that had been on the court's
docket for nearly a decade were quickly resolved and displayed a
substantially higher settlement rate than before the mediation
panel was introduced. 105 On the average, settlement of cases has
resulted in a savings of five trial days per case. 106 Quicker disposition and avoidance of lengthy legal proceedings promises tremendous reduction in the expense of handling malpractice claims.
Projections of such savings has caused at least one insurance
company to reduce its premiums for malpractice insurance in
New York by two percent. 107 Potentially damaging publicity to
physicians charged with malpractice is minimized by the more
private nature of mediation panel proceedings, and the difficulty
of securing expert witnesses to testify in behalf of meritorious
claimants at trial is overcome. 108
Malpractice mediation panels similar to that enacted in Illinois offer an attractive alternative to litigation: by means of an
inexpensive process, nonmeritorious claims are discouraged while
justifiable claims are either quickly settled or propelled into trial
with expert testimony ensured. Particularly important in the
light of this note is the additional fact that under most mediation
panel statutes, including that of Illinois, the courts and a jury
trial remain available to the parties, thus guaranteeing basic constitutional rights.
105. Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HoFSTRA L. REv. 261, 275-76 (1974).
106. !d. at 278.
107. Comment, Medical Malpractice in New York, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 657, 795
(1976) (citing STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 126-27 (1976)).
108. See Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(5) (1975), which
provides:
Whenever a unanimous determination of a medical review panel is rejected
by a party, each party that has accepted the determination may request any
medical society which has supplied names for the roster of practicing physicians
for that panel to provide an expert witness for consultation and, if necessary,
for testimony at trial.

